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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
gains, appears to be that of the principal case, which taxes thegain in the hands of the person who has the freedom to dispose ofit and who derives a "readily realizable economic value from it."
Jerome D. Adner
INCOME TAX-COSTS IN VIOLATION OF CEILING PRICES
HELD DEDUCTIBLE
In their income tax returns, taxpayers included amounts paidin excess of World War II ceiling prices in computing their deduc-
tions for cost of goods sold. These over-ceiling payments were
disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. In the first
appellate rulings on the question three Circuit Courts held that in
the absence of legislation to the contrary, such payments are de-ductible from gross receipts as a part of the cost of goods sold, indetermining gross income. Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F. 2d221 (1st Cir. 1952); Hofferbert v. Anderson Oldsmobile, rnc., 197F. 2d 504 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Commissioner v. Guminski, 198 F. 2d 265(5th Cir. 1952).
An income tax, levied by Congress under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, in order to be valid, must be based only
upon income, and if other than income is used as the bais for such
a tax it is a direct tax requiring apportionment under Art. I § 9
of the Constitution. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
No income from business operations can be realized until the cost
of goods sold has been recovered, and therefore an income tax can-
not reach receipts from which that cost has not been subtracted.
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179 (1918); Sullenger, 11T. C. 1076 (1948). Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Code§ 22 (a), and U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a)-5 (1943), provided
that the cost of goods sold should be offset against gross receiptsin determining gross income from business for income tax pur-
poses.
Considering the constitutional limitations of the SixteenthAmendment alone, it is clear that Congress could not pass an
income tax disallowing the deduction from gross receipts of anypart of the cost of goods sold. However, such an otherwise un-
constitutional exercise of the taxing power may be found valid
when applied as incident to some other power of Congress. Thus,
if the tax is an expedient regulation of commerce by Congress,
and the end to be attained is one falling within the commercepower, then the tax is not void, although within a loose and more
extended sense than was used in the Constitution it was called a
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tax. Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884).- Such regulatory
taxes are not subject to the rules which would invalidate an ordi-
nary tax. Teazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 549 (U. S. 1869).
In 1942 Congress in a valid exercise of its war powers, Yalcus
v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944), enacted the Emergency
Price Control Act, 56 STAT. 23, 50 U. S. C. App. § 901 (1942), under
which the ceiling prices here violated were set up. At that time,
or subsequently, Congress through use of its incidental powers,
U. S. Const. Art. I § 8, could have implemented the act to include,
among the other penalties imposed for violations, income tax dis-
allowances for such parts of deductions for cost of goods sold as
represented over ceiling payments. A similar penalty was imposed
by the Stabilization Act of 1942, 56 STAT. 767, 50 U. S. C. App. § 965
(a) (1942), disallowing deductions for wage payments made in
excess of wage ceilings, being held valid in-Weather-Seal Mfg. Co.,
16 T. C. 1312 (1951)..
Although allowing ceiling price violators deductions on income
tax returns for such illegal payments would seem to be contrary
to public policy, such deductions for cost of goods sold have been
allowed, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, even where
the entire business carried on was illegal. United States v. Sid-
livan, 274 U. S. 259 (1927) (illegal liquor business). Penalties are
not created by public policy or implication; they must be expressly
imposed or they cannot be enforced. Elliott v. East Penn. R., 99
U. S. 573 (1878); United States v. Winchester & Co., 40 F. 2d 472
(2d Cir. 1930).
Thus in the principal cases the courts correctly found for the
taxpayers, since constitutionally the only way to justify the Com-
missioner's disallowances would be as a penalty for price ceiling
violations, a penalty which Congress had not invoked. Today this
apparent conflict between public policy and the law has been cor-
rected by the 1951 amendments to the Defense Production Act of
1950, 65 STAT. 136 (1951), 50 U. S. C. App. § 2105 (a) (Supp. 1952),
which empower the President to prescribe the extent to which pay-
ments made in violation of price regulations may be disallowed by
the government for tax and other purposes. And the position of
the principal cases has been adopted by the Bureau in I. T. 4104,
5 CCH Fed. Tax Rep. 6336 (Nov. 12, 1952).
Robert S. Gottesman
